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Abstract 
 
Understanding the cognitive underpinnings of moral judgment is one of most pressing problems 
in psychological science. Some highly-cited studies suggest that reliance on intuition decreases 
utilitarian (expected welfare maximizing) judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas in which one 
has to decide whether to instrumentally harm (IH) one person to save a greater number of people. 
However, recent work suggests that such dilemmas are limited in that they fail to capture the 
positive, defining core of utilitarianism: commitment to impartial beneficence (IB). Accordingly, 
a new two-dimensional model of utilitarian judgment has been proposed that distinguishes IH 
and IB components. The role of intuition on this new model has not been studied. Does relying 
on intuition disfavor utilitarian choices only along the dimension of instrumental harm or does it 
also do so along the dimension of impartial beneficence? To answer this question, we conducted 
three studies (total N = 970, two preregistered) using conceptual priming of intuition versus 
deliberation on moral judgments. Our evidence converges on an interaction effect, with intuition 
decreasing utilitarian judgments in IH—as suggested by previous work—but failing to do so in 
IB. These findings bolster the recently proposed two-dimensional model of utilitarian moral 
judgment, and point to new avenues for future research.  
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Introduction 
 
Understanding how ordinary people make decisions within the moral domain is of 
profound importance, both theoretically and practically. Theoretically, it is important because of 
the fundamental role that moral considerations play in numerous aspects of our cognitive life: if 
we want to fully understand how the mind works, we must understand the moral mind. 
Practically, it is important because we are all affected by the moral decisions of those around us, 
often in serious ways: effective public policy, for instance, depends on a keen appreciation of 
how the moral psychology of ordinary people actually works. It is no surprise, then, that interest 
in moral psychology has blossomed in the last few decades. 
 Over those years, work in the area has been dominated by the use of what might be called 
‘sacrificial’ moral dilemmas. These refer to—usually hypothetical—situations in which a person 
must decide whether to endorse an action that is expected to maximize welfare (e.g., save the 
most number of lives) while foreseeably causing the death of at least one innocent person, often 
instrumentally. For example, is it morally permissible to torture an innocent person to death if 
this would be necessary to prevent a major terrorist attack that would kill hundreds of people, 
assuming that no one would find out about the torture? Most people recognize that there is a 
tension between two competing moral positions in such cases, but different people may resolve 
this tension differently. In the terrorism example, those who endorse torturing the innocent 
person are typically said to be making a ‘consequentialist’ judgment, because in this specific 
context such an action appears to be consistent with what is required by moral theories holding 
that the rightness or wrongness of an action depends only on its consequences. A particularly 
famous consequentialist theory is act utilitarianism, which holds, more specifically, that “actions 
are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the 
reverse of happiness” (Mill, 1863; see also Bentham 1789/1983). In line with the focus of most 
other work in moral psychology, we will concern ourselves only with act utilitarianism in this 
paper, setting aside other consequentialist theories (e.g., rule-based theories, or theories holding 
that the moral status of an action depends on consequences other than happiness or well-being).  
 There are many ways to reject utilitarianism—for example, one might be inclined toward 
Aristotelian virtue ethics, or a feminist ethics of care—but the main non-utilitarian moral theory 
discussed in the contemporary moral psychology literature is ‘deontology.’ Broadly speaking, a 
deontological moral theory holds that the rightness or wrongness of an action depends on 
whether it fulfils certain moral norms, rules, or duties, regardless of the consequences (e.g. Kant, 
1797/2002). Because deontology is usually treated as the main, or perhaps the only, alternative to 
utilitarianism, people who decline to endorse the ostensibly utilitarian option in a sacrificial 
moral dilemma are often said to have made a ‘deontological’ judgment (Greene, 2015). So, for 
example, if someone declines to endorse the torturing of an innocent person in the terrorism 
example, despite the fact that this has been stipulated to lead to the deaths of hundreds of other 
innocent people, it is typically assumed that this person’s motivation or reasoning must be based 
in deontological considerations—for example, a Kantian prohibition on using other people as a 
mere means to an ends, or perhaps more simply, an intuitive application of the commonsense 
moral rule that killing innocent people is wrong (even if it may have good consequences).   
 According to now classic work in moral psychology (beginning with Greene, 
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley & Cohen, 2001), tendencies to favour ‘utilitarian’ or 
‘deontological’ resolutions to sacrificial moral dilemmas reflect two distinct and dissociable 
underlying cognitive processes in the psychology of ordinary people, characterized by Greene 
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(2008) as psychological natural kinds. According to this view, utilitarian tendencies and 
deontological tendencies map onto even more basic cognitive systems that operate quite 
differently. One system (System 1) is said to be fast, intuitive, and primarily affective, whereas 
the other system (System 2) is said to be slow, deliberative, and rational (Chaiken & Trope, 
1999; Epstein, 1994; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011; Sloman, 1996; but see 
Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018).  
 Such dual-process theories have fruitfully modelled people’s behaviour in a number of 
contexts, including problem solving (Fetterman & Robinson, 2013), consumer behavior (Shiv & 
Fedorikhin, 1999), person perception (Tamir, Thornton, Contreras, & Mitchell, 2016), 
cooperative behaviour (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), altruistic behaviour (Rand et al, 2016), 
honest behaviour (Capraro, 2017), and, indeed, moral judgments in sacrificial dilemmas (Li et al, 
2018). According to Greene’s influential dual process model, ‘deontological’ judgments 
(refusing to sacrifice the one innocent person) are based in immediate intuitions or emotional 
gut-reactions, whereas ‘utilitarian’ judgments (sacrificing the innocent person to save a greater 
number) are uniquely attributable to effortful reasoning.  
 There is now a large body of evidence supporting this perspective: that is, the view that 
deliberation favors ‘utilitarian’ judgments whereas intuition favors ‘deontological’ judgments. 
(Ciaramelli, Muccioli, Ladavas & di Pellegrino, 2007; Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Cummins & 
Cummins, 2012; Koenigs et al, 2007; Kvaran, Nichols & Sanfey, 2013; Greene et al, 2001; 
Greene et al, 2008; Li, Xia, Wu & Chen, 2018; Mendez, Anderson, & Shapria, 2005; Patil et al, 
2018; Spears, Fernández-Linsenbarth, Okan, Ruz & González, 2018; Suter & Hertwig, 2011; 
Timmons & Byrne, 2018 Trémolière & Bonnefon, 2014; Trémolière, De Neys & Bonnefon, 
2012). For example, participants typically take longer to make pro-sacrifice (utilitarian) 
decisions, which is thought to reflect greater cognitive effort (Greene et al, 2001), whereas 
forcing participants to respond quickly under time pressure (Suter & Hertwig, 2011; Trémolière 
& Bonnefon, 2014), or increasing cognitive load (Trémolière & Bonnefon, 2014) tends to reduce 
the incidence of such decisions. Based upon these and similar findings, Greene and colleagues 
have proposed that utilitarian psychological tendencies—and even normative utilitarian 
philosophical theories—are rooted in higher-level, deliberative mental processes corresponding 
to superior moral judgment, whereas deontological psychological tendencies and associated 
moral theories are rooted in lower-level, emotionally-driven mental processes corresponding to 
unreflective gut responses (for extensive criticism of this view, see Berker, 2009). 
 In recent years, Kahane and colleagues (Kahane, 2015; Kahane et al, 2015; Kahane et al, 
2018; Kahane & Shackel, 2010) have challenged the dual process model on the grounds that 
previous research has focused almost entirely on sacrificial dilemmas. According to these critics, 
sacrificial dilemmas are limited in that they bear on just one dimension of utilitarianism, namely, 
the permissibility of causing instrumental harm (IH), whereas they fail entirely to capture a 
second, more fundamental dimension of utilitarianism, namely, a commitment to impartial 
beneficence (IB). This refers to the moral requirement that one must strive to promote the greater 
good of all human beings (or even all sentient life) in a radically impartial way, that is, without 
regard to the physical, emotional, or relational distance between the actor and the beneficiary 
(Singer, 1979). Definitionally, such a drive to maximize the good is what utilitarianism is all 
about. Now sometimes, it may be the case that stringently pursuing this more basic, beneficent 
aim will require that one causes instrumental harm—but that is not typical case in real life. 
Under ordinary circumstances, impartially promoting the good of all tends to involve the very 
opposite of causing harm, namely helping others and performing good deeds. Indeed, even the 
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most committed utilitarian would prefer to avoid causing harm, instrumental or otherwise, 
insofar as this could be reconciled with maximizing welfare. Therefore, the widespread focus on 
such harm in moral psychology studies is arguably both peculiar and misleading.  
 Motivated by this insight, Kahane, Everett et al. (2018) introduced a two-dimensional 
model of utilitarian psychology with both IH and IB components. To measure people’s position 
in this two-dimensional space, Kahane and colleagues created, refined, and validated a new 
scale: the “Oxford Utilitarianism Scale” (OUS). This scale consists of nine short statements or 
scenarios, five in the dimension of impartial beneficence (IB) and four in the dimension of 
instrumental harm (IH). Kahane and colleagues found that these two dimensions are 
psychometrically independent, suggesting that IB and IH are dissociable not just conceptually 
but also psychologically. For example, empathic concern (Davies, 1980), identification with all 
of humanity (McFarland, Webb & Brown, 2012), and concern for future generations were found 
to be positively associated with IB but negatively associated with IH. Moreover, IH was 
correlated with subclinical psychopathy (Levenson, Kiehl, &Fitzpatrick, 1995), whereas IB was 
correlated with religiosity (Huber & Huber, 2012). Thus, these two dimensions have different 
individual correlates. Moreover, they have different second-order effects on social judgment. A 
number of studies have now reported that in the domain of IH, non-utilitarian agents are 
consistently rated as more moral and trustworthy than utilitarian agents (Bostyn & Roets, 2017; 
Brown & Sacco, 2017; Capraro et al, 2018; Kreps & Monin, 2014; Everett, Pizarro & Crockett, 
2016; Lee, Sul & Kim, in press; Rom, Weiss & Conway, 2017; Rom & Conway, 2018; Sacco et 
al, 2016; Uhlmann, Zhu & Tannenbaum, 2013). This is not the case, however, within the domain 
of IB: Everett et al. (2018) have found that non-utilitarian agents tend to be preferred to 
utilitarian ones only for close interpersonal relationships (e.g., friend, spouse), but not for more 
distant roles (e.g., political leader).  
 The emerging picture thus seems to be that utilitarian decisional tendencies among 
everyday people do not constitue a single psychological dimension driven by deliberation, in 
contrast to deontological decisional tendencies driven by intuition. Rather, such utilitarian 
thinking appears to be itself divided into two, even more basic psychological dimensions, 
namely, a relative willingness to endorse—or a lack of aversion to—causing instrumental harm 
(IH), and a relative commitment to impartial beneficence (IB). If intuitive, System 1 mental 
processing is thought to disfavor utilitarian judgment—as prior research strongly suggests—we 
must therefore ask: Along which dimension? Does it do so just along IH, consistent with the 
focus of the sacrificial dilemmas current predominating in this area of research? Or does it do so 
also along IB, which has only recently been identified as a distinct psychological component of 
utilitarian thinking? 
 In this paper we investigate this question, reporting the results of three empirical studies 
(total N = 970, two preregistered). In these studies, we manipulated participants’ cognitive 
process through conceptual priming of intuition (Shenhav, Rand & Greene, 2011; Rand, Greene, 
Nowak, 2012; Levine et al, 2018) and assessed their endorsement of IH and IB on the OUS. This 
is novel in two key ways. First and foremost, it is the first study of its kind to address the 
cognitive underpinnings of impartial beneficence, which we have suggested is a fundamental 
aspect of utilitarian judgment. Second, even within the domain of instrumental harm—which has 
been the focus of previous work—our method allows for a better test of the claims of the dual-
process model. This is because we rely on short items from the OUS that have been extensively 
validated, instead of the more complicated, messy, and less well-validated sacrificial moral 
dilemmas (Bauman, McGraw, Bartels, & Warren, 2014). If the effect on IH can be conceptually 
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replicated using these short, validated items, this would allow us to have greater confidence in 
the claims of the dual-process model regarding the IH component of utilitarian psychology.  
 A final contribution of this work is that it assesses, for the first time, the susceptibility of 
the OUS to priming. Since the OUS was introduced as a trait-level measure of individual 
differences in proto-utilitarian psychological tendencies, it is important to determine whether or 
to what extent participants’ responses to the short items can be influenced by explicit instructions 
to rely on intuition versus deliberation. 
 
Study 1 
 
Our first experiment was a non-preregistered exploratory study looking at the effect of priming 
intuition versus deliberation on participants’ scores on the OUS. For this and the other studies, 
we report all measures, manipulations and exclusions; in all the studies, data collection was not 
continued after the analysis. 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants were recruited on Amazon MTurk and paid $0.50 for participating. After eliminating 
duplicate IP addresses and MTurk IDs (10 observations) and/or individuals who left the OUS 
incomplete (1 observation), we had a final sample of 263 participants (47% females; mean age = 
36.9, SD = 12.2). No a priori power analysis was conducted for this study. Sample size was 
determined by the amount of available funding left over from a previous project. A sensitivity 
power analysis based on a significance level a = 0.05 and power b = 0.8 shows that the sample 
size we achieved was sufficient to detect a small effect size of f = 0.09. In the study, participants 
were randomly assigned to one of two between-subjects conditions (intuition vs. deliberation). 
Following Levine et al. (2018), Study 3, participants were encouraged to use their intuitive (or 
deliberative) system through a conceptual prime making salient how emotion (or reason) leads to 
“good decision making” and “satisfying decisions.”  
 
Conceptual priming of intuition in Study 1  
 
Sometimes people make decisions by using feeling and relying on their emotion. 
Other times, people make decisions by using logic and relying on their reason. 
 
Many people believe that emotion leads to good decision-making. When we 
use feelings, rather than logic, we make emotionally satisfying decisions. Please 
answer the following nine questions by relying on emotion, rather than reason. 
 
Conceptual priming of deliberation in Study 1 
 
Sometimes people make decisions by using logic and relying on their reason. 
Other times, people make decisions by using feeling and relying on their emotion. 
 
Many people believe that reason leads to good decision-making. When we use 
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logic, rather than feelings, we make rationally satisfying decisions. Please answer 
the following nine questions by relying on reason, rather than emotion. 
 
 Our dependent measure was the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS), consisting of 9 items 
in two sub-scales to which participants indicated their agreement on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The first subscale - Impartial Beneficence (OUS-IB) - consists of 
5 items reflecting endorsement of the impartial maximization of the greater good, even at the 
cost of personal self-sacrifice (e.g., “If the only way to save another person’s life during an 
emergency is to sacrifice one’s own leg, then one is morally required to make this sacrifice”). 
The second subscale - Instrumental Harm (OUS-IH) - consists of 4 items reflecting a relative 
willingness to cause harm in order to bring about the greater good (e.g., “It is morally right to 
harm an innocent person if harming them is a necessary means to helping several other innocent 
people”). Mean scores on both dimensions were computed for all participants, and showed good 
reliability (Cronbach’s a = 0.781 in the intuition condition, and 0.783 in the reason condition for 
OUS-IB; a = 0.726 in the intuition condition, and 0.826 in the reason condition for OUS-IH). 
When completing these questions, participants were reminded to “rely on emotion [reason].” 
Exact experimental instructions are reported in the Appendix. 
 To analyze results, we used linear regression, entering conceptual prime condition as a 
between-subjects factor (0 = intuition, 1 = deliberation) and dummy-coding scores on each OUS 
dimension as a within-subjects variable (0 = IH; 1 = IB)  
 
Results 
 
A linear regression predicting OUS scores as a function of conceptual prime condition, OUS 
dimension, and their interaction, revealed a significant overall effect (R2 = 0.04, F(3,522)=6.84, 
p<.001). Moving to the main effects, we found a significant effect of OUS dimension (b=0.601, 
t=3.60, p <.001), no significant main effect of conceptual prime (b=0.123, t=0.68, p <.495), and, 
crucially, a significant interaction of prime and scores on each dimension (b= 0.851, t = 3.38, p < 
.001). This pattern of results suggests that conceptual priming had a different impact on the two 
dimensions of utilitarian psychology. Breaking the interaction down by looking at each 
dimension separately, we replicated previous work by showing that endorsement of instrumental 
harm was significantly higher, R2 = 0.06, F(1,261)=16.65, p<.001, when deliberation was primed 
(M = 4.27, SD = 1.76) than when intuition was primed (M = 3.54, SD = 1.18). Whereas by 
contrast, we found no significant difference, R2 < 0.01, F(1,261)=0.47, p=4.94, in endorsement 
of impartial beneficence depending on whether deliberation (M = 4.02, SD = 1.44) or intuition 
was primed (M = 4.14, SD = 1.41). Since we had sufficient power to detect even a small effect 
size, we take this null finding to be meaningful (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Priming intuition decreases utilitarian judgments in the domain of instrumental harm, 
but not impartial beneficence. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. (Study 1). 
 
Discussion 
 
Our first study provides initial evidence that promoting intuition decreases utilitarian judgments 
in the domain of instrumental harm but not in the domain of impartial beneficence. To see 
whether this exploratory result could be replicated and thus enhance confidence in these results, 
we conducted a second, pre-registered, study. 
 
Study 2 
 
The goal of the second study was to replicate the finding from Study 1 with a pre-registered 
design, adjusting the priming materials to more closely align with our research questions. In our 
context, we are not really interested in “emotionally satisfying” versus “rationally satisfying” 
decisions. Rather, we are interested in what people perceive to be the right thing to do. 
Therefore, we decided to replace, in the original primes from Levine et al. (2018) that we used in 
Study 1, the words “emotionally [rationally] satisfying decisions” with “better decisions,” and to 
add one sentence that more explicitly refers to the rightness of using the positively primed 
cognitive system. Additionally, we decided to use the word “intuition” instead of the word 
“emotion,” given that previous work has focused not just on the importance of emotions to non-
utilitarian judgments, but also the role of intuitions more generally. 
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Method 
 
Participants were recruited on Amazon MTurk and paid $0.50 for participating. As noted in our 
pre-registration, sample size was determined through an a priori power analysis showing that we 
would need at least 200 participants to detect a small effect size of f = 0.10, taking a significance 
level a=.05 and a power b = 0.80. To account for any exclusions or technical problems, we 
recruited 250 participants. After eliminating duplicate IP addresses and MTurk IDs (4 
observations) and/or individuals who left the OUS incomplete (0 observations), we had a final 
sample of 246 participants (43% females; mean age = 33.8, SD = 9.9). None of these participants 
had participated in the previous study. A sensitivity power analysis with significance a = 0.05 
and power b = 0.8 showed that our sample size was sufficient to detect a small effect of f = 
0.089. The dependent variables were the same as in Study 1. The design, analysis, exclusion 
criteria, and sample size were pre-registered at: https://aspredicted.org/gr68s.pdf.  
 The design was identical to Study 1, except for the conceptual primes, which in this case 
were as follows: 
 
  Conceptual priming of intuition in Study 2  
 
Sometimes people make decisions by using feeling and relying on their intuitions. 
Other times, they make decisions by using logic and relying on their reason. 
 
Many people believe that intuition leads to good decision-making: whether 
something 'feels right' is often a good indication of whether it is right. When we 
rely on our automatic 'gut feelings', instead of just logic, we often make better 
decisions.  
 
Please answer the following nine questions by relying on your intuitions, rather 
than reason. When you read each question, focus on your first, emotional 
response and your ‘gut-feeling’. Try not to think too much about each question, 
and instead just focus on what your intuition tells you. 
 
Conceptual priming of deliberation in Study 2 
 
Sometimes people make decisions by using logic and relying on their reason. 
Other times, they make decisions by using feeling and relying on their intuitions.  
 
Many people believe that reason leads to good decision-making: whether 
something is rational and makes logical sense is often a good indication of 
whether it is right. When we think carefully through a problem, rather than just 
going on automatic ‘gut-feelings’, we often make better decisions.  
 
Please answer the following nine questions by relying on reason, rather than 
intuition. When you read each question, focus on thinking and reasoning about 
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the question. Try not to focus on what your emotional gut-reactions tell you, and 
instead think carefully about each question. 
 
 
Results 
 
A linear regression predicting OUS scores as a function of conceptual prime condition, OUS 
dimension, and their interaction, revealed a marginally significant overall effect (R2 = 0.02, 
F(3,488)=2.47, p=0.06). Moving to the main effects, we found no significant effect of OUS 
dimension (b=0.238, t=1.34, p=0.181), nor a significant main effect of conceptual prime (b=-
0.122, t=0.68, p <.495), but a nearly significant interaction of prime and scores on each 
dimension, (b = 0.337, t = 1.78, p = 0.076). Although the observed p value did not satisfy our 
pre-registered alpha criterion, it was very close to it, suggesting that conceptual priming may 
have had a meaningfully different impact on the two dimensions of utilitarian psychology. 
Breaking the interaction down by looking at each dimension separately, we replicated Study 1 by 
showing that endorsement of instrumental harm was significantly higher, R2 = 0.01, 
F(1,244)=6.39, p=0.012, when deliberation was primed (M = 4.45, SD = 1.37) than when 
intuition was primed (M = 4.00, SD = 1.47). Also consistent with Study 1, there was no 
significant difference, R2 < 0.01, F(1,244)=0.49, p=0.487, in endorsement of impartial 
beneficence depending on whether deliberation (M = 4.36, SD = 1.37) or intuition was primed 
(M = 4.23, SD = 1.35) (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Priming intuition decreases utilitarian judgments in the domain of instrumental harm, 
but not impartial beneficence. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. (Study 2). 
 
 
Discussion  
 
The results of Study 2 were essentially consistent with those of Study 1, albeit with slightly 
different priming materials designed to more closely bear on the research question. However, the 
predicted interaction effect in this study was - in contrast to Study 1 - only marginally significant 
by conventional standards (p = .076). Therefore, we decided to conduct a third study, with the 
goal of addressing some of the potential shortcomings of Study 2. 
 
Study 3 
 
We could see three possible limitations to Study 2: perhaps, despite our power analyses, we just 
did not have enough statistical power for this specific effect; perhaps we used a too long a 
conceptual priming passage, which may have caused some participants to lose interest; and 
perhaps the word “intuition” was less evocative than the word “emotion.” Therefore, in Study 3, 
we collected a larger sample size and used a conceptual prime that combined the relevant 
features from Study 1 and Study 2. Specifically, as in Study 1, the priming passages in Study 3 
were very short and used the word “emotion” instead of the word “intuition.” But as in Study 2, 
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the priming material in Study 3 does not use the words “emotionally [rationally] satisfying 
decisions,” but rather, “better decisions.” 
 
Method 
 
Participants were recruited on Amazon MTurk and paid $0.50 for participating. After eliminating 
duplicate IP addresses and MTurk IDs (6 observations) and/or individuals who left the OUS 
incomplete (1 observation), we had a final sample of 461 participants (40% females; mean age = 
35.6, SD = 10.1). As noted in our pre-registration, our sample size was determined through 
recruiting as many participants as we could within our budgetary constraint. Nonetheless, a 
sensitivity power analysis with significance a = 0.05 and power b = 0.8 shows that our sample 
size was sufficient to detect a small effect of f = 0.065.  
The design, analysis, exclusion criteria, and sample size were pre-registered at: 
https://aspredicted.org/9hv38.pdf. The variables were the same as in previous studies. Please 
note that the elimination from the analysis of the one participant who left the OUS incomplete 
was not pre-registered. Regardless, results remain the same if we include this participant in the 
analysis. None of our participants had participated in the previous studies.  
 The design was identical to Study 1, except for the slight differences to the conceptual 
primes, which were in this case as follows: 
 
  Conceptual priming of intuition in Study 3 
 
Sometimes people make decisions by using feeling and relying on their emotion. 
Other times, people make decisions by using logic and relying on their reason. 
 
Many people believe that emotion leads to good decision-making. When we 
use feelings, rather than logic, we make better decisions. Please answer the 
following nine questions by relying on emotion, rather than reason. 
 
Conceptual priming of deliberation in Study 3 
 
Sometimes people make decisions by using logic and relying on their reason. 
Other times, people make decisions by using feeling and relying on their emotion. 
 
Many people believe that reason leads to good decision-making. When we use 
logic, rather than feelings, we make better decisions. Please answer the following 
nine questions  by relying on reason, rather than emotion. 
 
 
Results 
 
A linear regression predicting OUS scores as a function of conceptual prime condition, 
OUS dimension, and their interaction revealed a marginally significant overall effect (R2 = 0.02, 
F(3,918)=5.65, p<0.001). Moving to the main effects, we found a significant effect of OUS 
dimension (b=0.428, t=3.39, p=0.001), no significant main effect of conceptual prime (b=0.008, 
t=0.68, p <.495), and a significant interaction of prime and scores on each dimension, b = 0.475, 
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t = 3.53, p < .001). Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, this pattern of results suggests that 
conceptual priming had a different impact on the two dimensions of utilitarian psychology. 
Breaking the interaction down by looking at each dimension separately, we replicated Study 1 by 
showing that endorsement of instrumental harm was significantly higher, R2 = 0.02, 
F(1,459)=10.81, p=0.001, when deliberation was primed (M = 4.28, SD = 1.56 than when 
intuition was primed (M = 3.82, SD = 1.47).  In contrast, there was no statistical difference, R2 < 
0.01, F(1,459)<0.01, p=0.949, in endorsement of impartial beneficence depending on whether 
deliberation (M = 4.28, SD = 1.50) or intuition was primed (M = 4.29, SD = 1.38) (see Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. Priming intuition decreases utilitarian judgments in the domain of instrumental harm, 
but not impartial beneficence. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. (Study 3). 
 
 
Discussion 
 
In this final replication, we found stronger results consistent with Study 1. Across all three 
studies, we observed the same pattern of results, suggesting that the basic effect is real and 
reliable. 
 
General Discussion 
 
In the last two decades, much work in moral psychology has applied dual process models to the 
study of ostensibly utilitarian judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas, concluding that non-
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utilitarian or ‘deontological’ judgments (refusing to sacrifice the one) are based in immediate 
intuitions and emotional gut-reactions, whereas utilitarian judgments (sacrificing the one to save 
a greater number) are more attributable to effortful reasoning (Ciaramelli et al, 2007; Koenigs et 
al, 2007; Greene et al, 2001; Greene et al, 2008; Mendez et al, 2005; Suter & Hertwig, 2011 
Trémolière & Bonnefon, 2014; Trémolière et al, 2012). In recent years, however, this work has 
been challenged by Kahane, Everett, and colleagues (2018) who argued that proto-utilitarian 
decision making breaks down into a two-dimensional psychological space, and that solely 
studying sacrificial dilemmas will not tell us much about utilitarian psychology generally 
(Kahane, 2015; Kahane & Shackel, 2010).  
 In particular, the two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology posits that there are at 
least two dimensions to consider – impartial beneficence (IB) and instrumental harm (IH) – and 
that these two dimensions are not just dissociable theoretically, but also empirically. These two 
dimensions have distinct psychological correlates (Kahane et al 2015, 2018) and even have 
divergent second-order effects on social perception (Everett et al, 2018). Based on a large body 
of work looking at the effects of intuition and deliberation on sacrificial decisions relating to IH, 
researchers have sought to draw conclusions about the nature of utilitarian psychology. But what 
about the second, more fundamental, dimension of utilitarianism – IB? In this study we 
investigated the role of deliberative versus intuitive cognitive processes in encouraging utilitarian 
decisions in both the IH and IB domains of utilitarianism.  
 We conducted three studies (total N = 970, two preregistered) in which we used conceptual 
priming to encourage participants to rely on intuition or deliberation when answering nine short 
questions tapping endorsement of IB or IH on the OUS. In the domain of IH, we conceptually 
replicated previous findings by showing that priming intuition reduces utilitarian decisions that 
involve causing harm for the greater good. In doing so, we demonstrate a causal link between 
reliance on intuition and decreased utilitarian judgments in sacrificial dilemmas using a different 
cognitive manipulation and different dependent measures from those used in previous studies. 
Specifically, we find that the effect of promoting intuition on the IH dimension of the OUS is 
similar to the effect of promoting intuition in classical sacrificial moral dilemmas, suggesting that 
the cognitive processes underlying responses to the OUS are similar to those underlying the more 
concrete dilemmas that have been employed in prior work. That being said, we cannot compare 
our results with previous findings along the IB dimension, since ours is the first set of studies to 
explore this dimension using current methods.  
In this dimension, we report a different pattern of results to the one observed for IH. 
Across the three studies, while priming intuition did decrease utilitarian judgments involving 
instrumental harm, it failed to do so for utilitarian decisions relating to impartial beneficence. 
The mean judgment across all three studies in the IB dimension when deliberation was primed is 
very similar to the average judgment when intuition was primed (4.23 vs 4.22), suggesting that 
the priming effect along the IB dimension is either zero or too small to be of interest (Lakens, 
2017). This different pattern of results between IH and IB suggests that these dimensions are not 
only psychologically distinct in terms of trait measurement, as suggested by Kahane et al. 
(2018), but distinct in terms of cognitive processing: conceptual priming of intuition selectively 
interferes with the IH dimension, but not with the IB dimension. Rather than intuition leading to 
non-utilitarian decisions in general, intuition seems to favor a refusal to inflict harm for the 
greater good specifically. 
Our work has several limitations. The first one is that it focuses on judgments in 
hypothetical dilemmas, rather than behaviour in real-life dilemmas. Virtually all studies in moral 
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philosophy and moral psychology have focused on hypothetical dilemmas, presumably because 
of the ethical difficulties that would be associated with causing real-world harm in a laboratory 
setting. However, a recent study by Bostyn, Sevenhant and Roets (2018) made an important step 
in addressing this issue by having humans making moral decisions ostensibly affecting rats 
rather than other humans. In their experiments, Bostyn et al. (2018) asked human participants to 
decide whether to administer an electroshock to one rat in order to save five rats from receiving 
the shock. Although in reality the shock was bogus, such that no rats were actually harmed, the 
authors found that participants’ judgments in overtly hypothetical dilemmas were not predictive 
of their behaviour in these (apparently) real dilemmas. Given this discrepancy between responses 
in hypothetical dilemmas and actual behaviour, an important direction for future research is to 
explore the extent to which intuition and deliberation underlie decisions in real-life moral 
dilemmas.  
Another limitation of our studies has to do with the use of conceptual primes. A possible 
downside of these primes is that they are transparent with respect to their purpose, as they 
explicitly mention the words emotion, intuition, and reason. This might create demand effects 
such that participants respond according to what they believe must be the function of intuition or 
reason (Rand, 2016). However, previous work suggests that conceptual primes have a similar 
effect as other cognitive manipulations, such as time pressure, cognitive load, and ego depletion, 
in several domains, including belief in God (Shenhav et al, 2012), cooperation (Rand et al, 
2012), lying (Cappelen, Sørensen & Tungodden, 2013), and, indeed, moral judgments in 
sacrificial dilemmas (Li et al, 2018). Moreover, our specific conceptual primes led to similar 
results as those of other cognitive manipulations in the context of sacrificial moral dilemmas (IH 
dimension), suggesting that our manipulation worked in a similar fashion to other, less explicit 
methods of inducing a reliance on intuition. Nevertheless, future work should certainly examine 
the robustness of our findings across a range of cognitive manipulations.1  
A third limitation of our studies, which applies equally the previous studies using 
sacrificial dilemmas, is that they cannot reveal the underlying motivations behind the responses 
of participants. Why does intuition promote non-utilitarian judgments in the IH dimension, but 
not in the IB dimension? At this stage, we can only speculate. One view is that deontological 
rules came about to function as simple heuristics that work well to promote human flourishing in 
most ordinary circumstances (Baron, 1994; Greene, 2008), but which must be overridden in 
special circumstances to achieve the same goal. Given that, psychologically, “bad is stronger 
than good” (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001), heuristics forbidding causing 
harm are likely to be more automatic and intuively accessible than heuristics about non-
obligatory help. Another potential explanation for why intuition does not affect moral judgments 
in the IB dimension might be that the kind of partiality (e.g., favoring friends and family) that 
characterizes the decisions of those low in IB would have been highly adaptive for our ancestors, 
and thus robust against competing deliberations (Bloom, 2011). Exploring these and other 
possible motivations that could underlie our effect should be a focus of subsequent studies. 
                                               
1 A related question concerns whether participants can meta-cognitively direct themselves to think intuitively or 
deliberately. This could be tested, for example, by asking participants to imagine some other participant answering 
the OUS after viewing the primes (or under some other cognitive manipulation), and assessing whether they make 
correct predictions about the responses of these participants. This is certainly a promising direction for future 
research that would go beyond the specific domain of moral judgments in the OUS: a similar question can be asked 
with respect to other cognitive processes that have been shown to affect people’s decisions, such as cooperation 
(Rand, 2016), altruism (Rand et al, 2016), and negative reciprocity (Hallsson, Hartwig & Hulme, 2018).  
 15 
To conclude, we report that conceptual priming of intuition decreases endorsement of 
instrumental harm but not impartial beneficience. This finding adds to work suggesting that 
utilitarian thinking cannot be understood solely in terms of psychological states or processes 
associated with a greater willingness to cause instrumental harm. Instead, it will be important to 
continue study the IH and IB dimensions of utilitarian psychology as separate constructs going 
forward. 
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Appendix 
 
We report the experimental instructions of Study 1. Those of Study 2 and Study 3 are identical, 
apart from the primes, as described in the main text. 
 
Experimental instructions of Study 1, Priming Emotion condition 
 
Sometimes people make decisions by using feeling and relying on their emotion. Other 
times, people make decisions by using logic and relying on their reason. 
 
Many people believe that emotion leads to good decision-making. When we use feelings, rather 
than logic, we make emotionally satisfying decisions. Please answer the following nine questions 
by relying on emotion, rather than reason. 
 
(page break) 
 
"If the only way to save another person’s life during an emergency is to sacrifice one’s own leg, 
then one is morally required to make this sacrifice." 
 
Rely on emotion. 
 
(answers collected using a 7-item Likert scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”) 
 
(page break) 
 
“It is morally right to harm an innocent person if harming them is a necessary means to helping 
several other innocent people.” 
 
Rely on emotion. 
 
(answers collected using a 7-item Likert scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”) 
 
(page break) 
 
“From a moral point of view, we should feel obliged to give one of our kidneys to a person with 
kidney failure since we don’t need two kidneys to survive, but really only one to be healthy.” 
 
Rely on emotion. 
 
(answers collected using a 7-item Likert scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”) 
 
(page break) 
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“If the only way to ensure the overall well-being and happiness of the people is through the use 
of political oppression for a short, limited period, then political oppression should be used.” 
 
Rely on emotion. 
 
(answers collected using a 7-item Likert scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”) 
 
(page break) 
 
“From a moral perspective, people should care about the well-being of all human beings on the 
planet equally; they should not favor the well-being of people who are especially close to them 
either physically or emotionally.” 
 
Rely on emotion. 
 
(answers collected using a 7-item Likert scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”) 
 
(page break) 
 
“It is permissible to torture an innocent person if this would be necessary to provide information 
to prevent a bomb going off that would kill hundreds of people.” 
 
Rely on emotion. 
 
(answers collected using a 7-item Likert scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”) 
 
(page break) 
 
“It is just as wrong to fail to help someone as it is to actively harm them yourself.” 
 
Rely on emotion. 
 
(answers collected using a 7-item Likert scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”) 
 
(page break) 
 
“Sometimes it is morally necessary for innocent people to die as collateral damage—if more 
people are saved overall.” 
 
Rely on emotion. 
 
(answers collected using a 7-item Likert scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”) 
 
(page break) 
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“It is morally wrong to keep money that one doesn’t really need if one can donate it to causes 
that provide effective help to those who will benefit a great deal.” 
 
Rely on emotion. 
 
(answers collected using a 7-item Likert scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”) 
 
 
